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What You See is not What You Get:
Product Architecture and Corporate Strategy

Weaving insights from the study of technology, operations, and organizational theory, we
examine factors that underlie decisions about product product architecture. The general principles
that determine the composition and interdependency between the components that make a product
have largely been relegated to the engineering literature. However, our preliminary results from a
Wharton-SMU study of product architecture in the imagining industry suggest several overlooked
factors that play an important role in determining product architecture and consequently – firm
performance. We suggest that product architecture decisions are far from being the exclusive domain
of engineers. Using a sample of firms and products from the imaging sector, we distinguish between
the engineering product architecture and perceived product architecture and note that they can be
decoupled. Second, we seek to determine how firm choices regarding the design architecture can be
mapped explained using variables such as firm prestige and customer sophistication.
Keywords: Product Architecture, Strategy, Cognition,
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The literature on product architecture1 has progressed to create a universal language
describing the principles that guide product design. It identified four product architecture archetypes
– integral, slot, bus, and sectional – that can be used to describe almost any product, however humble or
complex it may be (Ulrich, 1995). Those archetypes differ on the degree of interdependency of
components and how they relate to each other. For instance, in integral design, such as that of a
disposable ballpoint pen, all of the components fit tightly and idiosyncratically with one another.
The product is self-contained, its parts are highly interrelated, and the entire design is tightly
coupled. Such design has some advantages: it can simplify manufacturing processes, it presents the
consumer with neatly packaged product, and it makes it difficult for competitors to offer aftermarket or add-ons. The biggest drawback of such design lies in its inhospitality to change. At the
component level, because they are tightly related, even a minute change in the design of one
component will require a review and possible change in all of the other components.
Organizationally, that review and possible change has commensurate repercussions on the way
people inside and outside firm align their activities. The interfaces may be mapped onto the design
of the firm and determine the interdependencies among its parts. The interdependencies need to be
coordinated and whenever the design architecture becomes transformed, so does the corresponding
repertoire of coordination routines (compare Christensen and Rosenblom, 1995)
In bus design, the second design archetype we will discuss here, all the components fit into a
central interface that connects them to each other. While the connection to the bus may be
idiosyncratic, the components co-function without being connected directly to each other. Rather,
they all connect to the bus, not to each other. Thus, a removal or addition of a component does not

1 Management scholars have discussed general principles of design for quite some time, covering not only physical
products, but also such institutions as contracting and government (Baldwin & Clark). Our usage here is congruent with
that common in the engineering and operation literature, where scholars speak of “product architecture” (Ulrich). Both
usages are different from the common use of “design”, which has to do with the choice of such characteristics as shape
and material. They are also unlike the common use of architecture, which has to do with construction style.
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require a redesign of the entire product. Hence, for instance, one can remove a hard drive from a
desktop computer and replace it with a DVD drive. While the two components are different, they
are identical in the way they connect to the computer bus and interact with the other components,
such as the central processing unit and memory. Similarly, one can disconnect a set of speakers from
a high-end stereo amplifier and replace them with other speakers without making any changes to the
amplifier or the other components in the system. As long as the new speakers feature the same
interface as the prior ones, their other characteristics as irrelevant to the functioning system. Bus
design is not an entirely modular design, because each component must be connected to the bus
through a specific interface. Components that do not feature that interface cannot be connected to
the system. For instance, speakers that feature an optical interface, where sound data are transmitted
through pulses of light, cannot be connected to an amplifier that does not feature such interface.
Just like any design archetype, bus design has its merits and drawbacks. For one, it allows for greater
flexibility in customization of a product. By stocking just few alternative components, a computer
manufacturer can offer a great variety of combinations of hard drives and DVD drives, for instance.
Finally, sectional product architecture is based around complete modularity, where
components can be added or removed freely, in a Lego-like manner. Such would be the case with a
modular shelving system that can accommodate shelves of various lengths and width or stacks of
drawers or filing cabinets, or a combination thereof. While few products are belong purely to one
category, it is useful to perverse those categories for analytical purposes.
Students of technology have long been aware of the vast implication of product architecture
choices, and have engaged in a lively discussion on the proper fit between products or services and
their architecture Sako (2004, 2005) among others has been prominent in examining the architecture
of products and services, and the challenges they entail when firms seek to partially outsource the
design or production of certain components. As one may expect, however, this literature has
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maintained a strong engineering focus and rarely ventured beyond consideration of product function
and costs associated with sourcing, manufacturing, and servicing into such considerations as
strategic and organizational considerations as product differentiation or organizational. design. Our
data on the evolution of the imaging industry, supplemented with data from consumer electronic
products, suggest that a taking broader view produces new strategic insights.
What has largely escaped discussion is the notion that product design can have important
competitive consequences. The bus archetype has been hailed for its advantages in simplifying the
engineering process and allowing product customization at lower cost. However, its unheeded
adoption can have detrimental consequences for corporate strategy. This is because it allows users to
purchase add-on components or swap original components, thus reducing the original manufacturer
stream of revenue and potentially compromising product integrity.
This hazard is epitomized in products that derive profits from the Razor Blade model,
allegedly invented by King C. Gillette, where the initial product may be sold at a low profit margin,
but guarantees a stream of profits from selling high profit margin replacement parts (Tripsas &
Gavetti, 2000; Wikipedia). In the Gillette case, it meant selling low cost razors and profiting from
the high margins obtained on the replacement razors, without which the product quickly becomes
useless. Another example is printer ink cartridges, which, just like razor blades, require periodical
replacement. Because cartridges are connected to the printer in a discernable interface, third party
manufacturers have been able to offer alternative cartridges that fit in the printer just like those
made by the original manufacturer. By purchasing from such alternative sources, consumers can
circumvent the Razor Blade model and undermine the manufacturer strategy. So high are the stakes
around such strategy that the introduction of third party components has led to an on-going series
of legal challenges, which focus on whether the manufacturing of such add-on product infringes on
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the copyright on the original designer. So far, US courts have denied the claim (e.g. , "Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.").
Whenever a sector becomes increasingly modular in the mode in which products converge
towards certain standards the more compelling it becomes for manufacturers to settle on
architectural competencies while leaving the development and production of components to
strategic partners. The implication is that firms ought to accumulate design skills and social capital to
build a network of firms held together by long term, trust based alliances.
We argue that advantage of integral design emanates not only from the engineering
considerations noted above, but also from the place such design occupies in consumers’ mind. Our
data suggest that unsophisticated consumers prefer integral product architecture. Firms could reap
rewards from combining perceptual advantages the appearance of integral design with the
manufacturing advantages bus (or sectional) design. A challenge for firms is to design and produce a
modular architecture that notwithstanding its sectional properties has an integral appearance in the
market place.
We use Janus-faced, after the Roman deity Janus, to describe the two contrasting aspects of
products that simultaneously possess an appearance of integral product design while their
engineering underlying are based on bus (or sectional) product design. The process of production
does not necessarily signal the way buyers ought to observe the properties of a product. Questions
we should address include the matter of customer perception of product architectural design
(compare Winter, 1984 on technologies that can be observed and those that are hidden to
“outsiders.”). Some technologies, such as open source innovation (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003),
are highly visible and become shared among the participants (Levine, 2001), while others are
proprietary, cloaked trade secrets and by tight intellectual property arrangements.
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Method
While we developed understanding of the role product architecture plays in engineering and
operations, we know less about its potentially important role in firm strategy, including its effect on
firm status or the way it affect consumer perception. The rarity of previous research and the lack of
firm theoretical framing have led us to adopt qualitative research methods, which are more
appropriate for the inductive development of theory, when meaning, process, context, and
unanticipated phenomena are uncovered and explained (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin,
1990). Qualitative methods are suitable for theoretical development, as they may lead to the
discovery of a novel construct or unknown link between existing constructs.
Following the qualitative research method literature, we chose a maximum variation
sampling technique (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Maxwell, 1996). In this configuration, a researcher
specifically chooses sites that are likely to be quite different from each other, in order to use the
variance for generating rules about the relationships between variables. We have done the same by
sampling multiple industry sectors. We also collected data in multiple industry sectors, several
countries and geographical regions, and across positions and hierarchical ranks. This wide and
exploratory effort allowed us to discover the contingent framework that we present here.

Choice of Sites
We were drawn to two industries that evolved rapidly in recent years, because of our interest
in industry evolution (results reported elsewhere). Hence, we chose to focus on photographic
equipment. We also use a case from of a mobile music player (also known as MP3 players, after the
compression algorithm implemented in them). The photographic equipment industry has undergone
a fundamental shift as the image-capturing medium has evolved from analog (film) to digital
(charge-coupled device or CCD). It has been apparent not only in consumer-grade equipment,
7

where digital cameras have reached complete domination, but also in professional, military, and
medical applications. A similar shift has taken place in the market for mobile music players, where
the media have shifted from analog (e.g. cassette-based Walkman) and optical (compact disk player)
to memory and hard disk based devices. Prominent in this market is Apple iPod, who commands a
75% market share (Wingfield, 2006), which we used to demonstrate the generalizability of our ideas.
As commonly done in qualitative research, we began collecting data in an exploratory mode:
with interest in product architecture but without specific hypotheses, as to allow hypotheses to
emerge from the data. To allow for within-firm variance and to increase inter-site reliability, we
designed the study using a qualitative maximum variation sampling approach, which prescribes sampling
from potentially different sub-populations in order to identify differences and increase inter-site
reliability (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Maxwell, 1996). We achieved that by collecting data in multiple
industry sectors, several countries and geographical regions, and across positions and hierarchical
ranks. This wide and exploratory effort allowed us to discover the contingent framework that we
present here. To allow for cross-validation, we employed not only single interviews, but also a
variety of other data collection tools, such as repeated interviews, document analysis, and informal
conversations (Maxwell, 1996). The preliminary data reported here was collected in five months,
during which we conducted dozens of interviews, visited company locations, and attended industry
conference and seminar. Field notes about observations and informal interviews extended over
dozens of pages.
Insert Table 1 about here
Following established methods of grounded theory development, the study was conducted
in four phases, from preparation to theory building (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman,
1984; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In the pre-study phase, we prepared by reading industry trade
journals, articles in the business press, academic and case studies about the industry. We spent time
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identifying and contacting informants. To increase variance in qualitative sampled, we approached a
variety of informants. We called on engineers, chief executive officers, industry experts, and
journalists. We presented our interest and research plan, and asked whether they would be interested
in cooperation. As those confirmed their willingness, we deepened our understanding of the firms
involved by reviewing a variety of information sources, such as press articles, financial reports, and
sales materials.

Phase One: Fieldwork
Phase one consisted of data collection in the field, using interviews, repeated interviews,
document analysis, and informal conversations.
Informant Recruiting
Following the maximum variation sampling design, we recruited informants through several
channels. First, we used our familiarity with the industry and approached some informants directly,
contacted them by telephone and requested and requested a meeting. Once we recruited an
informant, we asked her or him to introduce us to their colleagues, supervisors, and subordinates, if
appropriate. Second, we scanned our institutional database to identify alumni employed in the focal
industry. Third, we approached some informants based on referrals from our acquaintances or other
informants. Fourth, we attended a large industry conference and seminar, where we approached and
recruited informants.
We believe that the combination of sampling approaches – direct request, database,
snowball, and on-site – helped to limit selection bias in the interviewee population (Maxwell, 1996;
Miles & Huberman, 1984; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). A request to meet was denied only once, when
we approached a contracting manufacturing firm.
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Interviews
Interviews were open-ended, moderately directive, and mostly aimed at producing a finedetailed description of activities in the informant professional area. The only exception was the
series of interview of a veteran journalist, where we used his expertise to discuss specific industry
occurrences and trends. Commonly, interviewees described a process they were involved in, such as
the selection of equipment for procurement, the development of a new model, or the contracting of
a sub-component. Since we were interested in product architecture, we probed related issues, but
only if those surfaced during the interview. For example, to elicit a detailed account, we sometimes
asked the interviewees about a specific occurrence they took part in, and ask them to take us
through the entire process. Then, if a relevant occurrence was mentioned (e.g., “We decided to
outsource development and production of our lenses to a lens manufacturer”), we would ask further
about it using nondirective terms (such as “Can you take us through how the decision was made?”
or “Would you tell us more about it?”). In other cases, we had previous knowledge that the
interviewee had had a relevant professional experience, e.g. was involved in the development of a
first digital camera. We then encouraged them to give a thorough account of the experience, starting
from the very moment they began to work on it and ending in the present.
Interviews lasted between thirty minutes and two hours, with an average of an hour per
interview. Most of the interviews were recorded; minority of them was documented through
extensive field notes that were elaborated after the interview. In line with ethical standards of
informed consent (American Sociological Association, 2001), we reiterated to the informants that
the meeting was voluntary, assured that the discussion would be kept strictly confidential, and asked
for permission to record it. In no interview has an interviewee requested to stop recording.
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Observations and Informal Conversations
We collected data not only through interviews but also through informal conversations. This
was the major method for data collection when we attend two industry events, part of the industry’s
main trade show, which we were invited by two of the informants. Together, we spent roughly 33
hours collecting data informally. We arrived to the tradeshow grounds in early in the morning’s
hours and spent there at least eight hours daily, until it was closed for the night. We scheduled one
or two formal interviews a day, leaving most of the time for informal interactions.
We engaged in conversations with attendants and exhibitors, recruited informants, and
collected documents, which were later analyzed. We took field notes recording such informal
discussions and observations, as well as documents we read. We took notes and recorded artifacts
with a digital camera, using those as data points in the subsequent analysis. Speaking informally,
without recording or visibly taking notes, allowed us to converse in a more relaxed atmosphere and
confirm things we heard in the interviews. It also provided leads into data and events that were not
mentioned in the interview because we simply did not know to ask about it.
Compared to other researchers who spent their entire study on one site, we chose to collect
data in multiple sites sequentially. Interviews took place in three European countries and in the
United States. This was a natural outcome of our decision to maximize variance sampling, and it
enables us to make an argument about the industry, rather than about a specific firm or firms in it.

Phase Two: Interpretation
In phase two, we developed a formed interpretation of the data. Most of the interviews were
recorded were recorded and then transcribed by an assistant or us. In addition to the transcription,
we used the recording to assure accuracy and add information about voice tone and conversational
pauses (Weiss, 1994). To the body of the interviews, we added our notes about the interviews. The
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field notes, detailing observations and informal discussions, were also typed. In addition, we
collected evidence from documents of and about firms and the industry, as described earlier.
Analysis of the data began almost as early as we embarked on the data collection effort.
Using qualitative analysis software (Bazeley & Richards, 2000; Burgess, 1995), we carefully examined
each datum and assigned it to several categories. Data were coded shortly after they were entered. As
data accumulated, we often refined categories by splitting them into sub-categories and recoding the
data into those categories. For instance, a category initially called “difficulty in moving from analog
to digital” was split to indicate whether the difficulties were the result of engineering setbacks or of
consumer perception. The quick growth of latter sub-category has led us to look in greater depth of
those instances, which eventually led to the identification of the strategic role played by product
design.
The process of coding data continued throughout the months of fieldwork and grew in
intensity in the hiatus between periods of fieldwork. As evidence accumulated, phenomena were
linked into patterns, and those were linked together in a framework. As data amassed, we kept
updating the framework by adding, dropping, and tweaking it.

Phase Three: Validation
In phase three, we worked to increase validity and reliability by presenting an early version of
the findings to informants and industry experts. We discussed the findings with industry observers
and other researchers who worked on similar topics. The discussions with key informants revealed
few errors in the data we used. The reactions we observed suggested that the findings were neither
obvious nor universally present in firms. While the qualitative nature of the data limits claim to
generalizability, we believe that the risk of invalidity is low, given the breadth and variance of the
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sample, the crosschecking of interviews, informal conversations and observations, and the feedback
in the validation phase.

Findings and Analysis
First, we use the case of Apple’s iPod to demonstrate how firms can decouple perceived
design from engineering design, using a Janus-faced design architecture, which satisfies lay
consumers’ preferences for integral design while reaping the benefits of bus or sectional design.
Second, we show that similar products can be built using markedly different product architecture, by
using data from our investigation of camera makers. We then proceed to hypothesize that firm
choice of architectural design can be mapped to the degree of sophistication of its consumers as well
as its place in the industry’s status hierarchy.
Janus-faced product architecture. To illustrate the nature of Janus-faced product
architecture, we turn Apple’s iPod, a mobile music player. When debuted in 2001, the 6.5-ounce,
stainless steel device, which was about the size of a deck of cards, could carry 1,000 digital
recordings on its five-gigabyte hard drive. Apple heralded it as the “unveiling of a breakthrough
digital device”, a claim that was met with skepticism with industry observers, as the marketplace for
such players was already crowded with offerings from other companies (Pogue, 2001). Financial
analysts warned that Apple might be erring by venturing into the low-margin consumer electronics
business and conjectured that the main contribution of the iPod would be in driving sales of the
company’s Macintosh line of computers (Tam, 2001).
Five years later, the iPod has become the subject of numerous admiring articles in the
managerial and popular press, described in such terms as “innovative” (Yoffie & Slind, 2006) or a
“perfect example” of “breakthrough offering” (Silverberg, 2005). Jack Walsh, the former executive
chief or General Electric has used the iPod example to preach the virtues of American innovation to
foreign audiences (Jin-Seo, 2006). Further, the iPod has arguably become an icon, whose influence is
described in the popular media to possess “fanatical devotion”, it is said to spun its own economy
with “companies that cater to the faithful” and create cultural trends (della Cava, 2005). Indeed, the
iPod influence has been described in gargantuan terms: “the iPod has changed our behavior and
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even our society. It has transformed Apple from a computer company into a consumer electronics
giant. It has remolded the music business, altering not only the means of distribution but even the
ways in which people enjoy and think about music. Its ubiquity and its universally acknowledged
coolness have made it a symbol for the digital age itself, with commentators remarking on ‘the iPod
generation’”(Levy, 2006).
Given its status, it is surprising that almost none of iPod components are produced or even
designed by Apple. A close inspection reveals that Apple assembled components that are generic,
licensed or have been available in the marketplace for a while. Although the specifics of Apple
relationships with its suppliers are closely guarded by the company, independent reviews suggest that
the iPod processor is produced by Portal Player while its operating software is licensed from Pixo.
The tiny hard disk that lies in the heart of the product is made by Toshiba, the battery is sourced
from Sony and other manufectures, and the liquid crystal display is said to be made by LG, a
consumer electronics maker, as well as other manufacturers. One of the few components made or
designed by Apple is the FireWire bus, which interfaces data transfer between the disparate
components (Day, 2005; Walker, 2003).
Insert (iPod architecture scheme) about here
Why do consumers view a collection of outsourced components as “sleek” or “elegant”,
perceiving it to be a culturally and economically transforming invention? We suggest that while
architecturally it is clearly based on bus design, the iPod is perceived as product that features integral
design. Hence,
H1: The perception of product architecture can be decoupled from its engineering
architecture
Decoupling design from perception is a significant achievement, because the ability of a firm
to infuse its products with an integral identity hinges very much on the degree to which the requisite
structures themselves -- internal or external -- are seamless (Henderson & Clark, 1990). If the
relationship between the makers of the various components that go into a product are not seamless
the consumer is likely to see them as being uncoupled and perceive its performance to be deficient.
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This is true because firms can manufacturer the similar products using markedly different designs.
We elaborate on that in the next section.

Choices of product architecture. We now turn to our data on the product design of
products in several segments of camera manufacturers to show how similar products can have
markedly different product architectures. Every camera, regardless of its technological sophistication
or price level, contains three basic elements: 1) lens, which focuses the light on the 2) capturing
device, which can be film holder or digital unit (CCD), and an 3) enclosure that houses these two
elements together with other optional elements, such as light meter or strobe (flash). This structure
has remained unchanged from the Camera Obscura of the 1700s to the high-end professional digital
cameras of the present.
Insert (camera scheme) about here
These components are universally present in cameras. Naturally, their specifications differ
according to the use of the camera. Most importantly for our purpose, the product architecture of a
camera can range fro integral to sectional. Many simple point-and-shoot cameras contain all of the
elements in a single, compact enclosure. When a consumer purchase a camera, she buys a bundle of
a lens, capturing device, and an enclosure, all usually carry the same brand name. As expected in
integral design, the components are tightly related, and one cannot replace the lens without replacing
the entire camera. Bus architecture in camera design is exemplified in a single-lens-reflector (SLR)
camera. These cameras, larger and more expensive, decouple the lens component from the other
components. Therefore, a consumer can purchase just a “body”, i.e. an enclosure that includes a
capturing device. Then, depends on the intended use of the camera, the purchaser can choose from
a variety of lenses, such as those intended for landscape, wildlife, or portrait work. The lenses are
made by the camera manufacturer or a number of independent makers, purchased separately, and
connect to the camera body through an electronic data connection, i.e. a type of bus, which
transmits data between them.
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Finally, sectional architecture in camera is exemplified in professional grade cameras. Known
as medium-format and large-format cameras, and used in photography studios and other
commercial applications, these cameras allow user to replace the lens and capturing device as
necessary, swapping and matching a lens, capturing media, and a camera body as needed. Thus, for
instance, a user can combine lens suitable for portraiture and capture the image on black and white
film, and instantaneously swap these components to lens suitable for close-up image and capture the
image digitally.
We use cameras to demonstrate how a given product can appear in several product design
architectures. Point-and-shoot cameras follow integral design, single-lens-reflector cameras follow
bus design, and medium/large format cameras follow sectional design. As the iPod case
demonstrated, firms can decouple a product’s perceived design from its engineering design. Hence,
firms have a decision space to determine how a product should be engineered and how it should be
communicated to consumers. What determines those decisions? In addition to engineering
considerations, we hypothesize that they are dependent on consumers’ preferences and on the firm’s
status.
Consumer Preferences and Firm Status. Different architectural designs are preferred by
consumers groups that are distinguished by their degree of sophistication. While lay consumers
gravitate towards the simple products of integral design, hobbyists and professional prefer the
flexibility and customization possibilities associated with bus and sectional design.
H2a: The less sophisticated a consumer segment is, the greater the preference for product
architecture that is closer to integral design.
H2b: The more sophisticated a consumer segment is, the greater the preference for product
architecture that is closer to sectional design.
Next we turn to the concept of firm status to inform about the ability of firms to achieve
product integration at high quality as communicated through status, whether legacy or current. Low
status firms face unfavorable production functions and endure negative channel dynamics while high
status firms cannot only produce more cheaply but also charge premia for their output. They also
face the threat of status leakage when they transact with low status firms. Polodny (2005; , 1993)
argues that interaction between unequal actors affect both sides’ status. While the lower-status actor
16

benefits from being associated with a higher-status actor, the latter suffers decreased status from
such interaction. Hence, high-status actors seek to limit such interaction, while low-status actors
seek it.. We apply this logic to argue that the higher a firm’s prestige, the greater its ability and the
lower the threshold for achieving a high degree of architectural integration with a strong sense of
product unity. We hypothesize that high status firms will seek avoid association with lower status
firms, and will labor to create a perception of integral design, even if their product is bus (or
sectional), as in the iPod case. In contrast, low status firms will seek association with higher status
firms by including components and will gravitate towards bus or sectional design. This leaves as
undesirable the combinations of low firm status-integral design and high firm status-sectional design.
H3a: When facing a combination of lay consumers and high status, a firm will perform
better in gravitating towards integral design.
H3b: When facing a combination of sophisticated consumers and low status, a firm will
perform better in gravitating towards sectional design.
Insert Table 2 about here
A profound paradox exist in the quest for a market preference for integral design and a,
coordinative, efficiency based sectional design. On the one hand, we posit a presence of market
segmentation along the dimension of customer sophistication and product perception from integral
to sectional. On the other hand, we argue that firms can be arrayed along a dimension of status
ranging from low to high prestige (J. M. Podolny, 1993) (Roberts, 1998; Podolny, 1993). The
challenge of firms to achieve product offerings that match the consumers preference for integral
designs is paradoxical since sophisticated or knowledgeable customers, such as lead users (von
Hippel, 1986, 2005) prefer sectional over integral designs. Lay, i.e. naïve and unsophisticated
consumers prefer integral designs. By contrast, high status firms who are expected to target
knowledgeable consumers, lean towards product architectures that embody bus or sectional design
while low status firms, catering to lay consumers, lean towards integral product architectures. The
implication is that high status firms face significant barriers to open their innovation towards those
customer segments that are most knowledgeable.
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Implications and Conclusion
For firms involved, these combinations suggest certain strategic modalities. As the inroads of
semiconductor technology into the photographic sector have rendered it products increasingly
modular, their decision whether to “make or buy” will increasingly require them to accumulate
social capital to implement alliances with firms that will embellish their status, assuming that status
is a signal of quality for which firms receive premia. That social capital enables high status firms to
guard their integrity (compare Podolny, 2005) lest their status will leak. Likewise, as Nickerson and
Silverman (2003) indicates, firms endure higher transaction costs (or their delivery of output is
costlier) when insourcing activities such as trucking , they face the dilemma of low versus high status
as conveyed by whether firms operate as owner operators rather than as employees of large trucking
chains.
We would, therefore, expect the photographic equipment manufacturers to partner with
component (e.g. lens, flash, bag, CCD) suppliers who enjoy the status to match their OEM and
ODM. Firms might enhance their status when they partner with high status suppliers, as illustrated
by Panasonic and Zeiss Ikon. Interestingly, large spreads are observed among component prices,
depending on the branding that is attached to the component.
At this stage, we are not yet ready to provide conclusive evidence for product design
architecture, firm status, and the exchange relationships that emerge among alliances of firms which
contract to design and manufacture photographic equipment. More data collection and analysis is to
be completed. The arguments so far suggest, however, interesting ideas for pushing the insights
regarding strategic alliances in sectors where insourcing and outsourcing is rampant and new firms
of organization, whether virtual or otherwise are becoming prominent (e.g., Li, 2007, Sako, 2006).
Our field study of photography shows ample evidence about insourcing becoming the dominant
form of organizing—both for the design of components and architecture as well as their
manufacturing, In fact insourcing and outsourcing appear to be even more common in the
photographic sector than in sectors such as vehicle manufacturing and computing or
telecommunication equipment. Yet, the knowledge to date remains incomplete regarding the
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governance of interfirm relationships and the sort of product architecture that can be mapped onto
those exchange relationships.
Sako (2003) showed that among vehicle (MV) manufacturers in Japan (Toyota, Nissan and
Honda) major variations exist around the coordination and knowledge transfer between these firms
and their outsourcing partners. Toyota appears to behave more aggressively in the transfer of tacit
knowledge onto their partners thus assuring a greater seamlessness between the components that
make up its architecture. In her comparative case study, she finds that Nissan and Honda appear to
behave more modestly when it involves the sharing of proprietary practices as distinct from
“teaching” or representation of what often looms to be tacit knowledge such as the Toyota
production system and its quality management. One would also expect the status of these firms and
their suppliers to produce differences in firm performance and to reveal heterogeneity in product
architecture. The management of exchange relationships within MVs has not reached the
institutionalized similarity among the firms, thus inviting questions regarding competitive advantages
and speed of innovation. The photographic sector might provide still another stage in which
patterns of inter-firm interaction, in relation to product design inform us about the intricate
relationships between product architecture, and the status among the insourcing and outsourcing
firms.

The following propositions derive from the arguments.

1.

As sectors witness a paradigm shift, the status legacy of their incumbents carries

forward after the disruptive technology has replaced the established technology
2.

Status constitute one of the major complementary assets that incumbent firms

leverage in their strategic efforts as their sector transitions into a new technology and market
3.

High status firms, compared to their low status peers enjoy a bargaining advantage

when partnering with firms possessing complementary assdets
4.

An incongruence exists among sectional versus integral product-market focus

derived from customer sophistication and producer status.
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5.

High status firms produce modular equipment whose architecture suggests an

integral configuration.
6.

High status firms form close and embedded alliances with high status partners; low

status firms form arms-length relationships with their suppliers
7.

High status firms engage in “evolutionary capability” (capability for capability

building—Sako, 2004) towards their insourcing partners, while low status firms resort to a more
basic “maintenance capability” (ability to maintain performance consistency).
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Name

Position

Company

Position

Firm Role

Industry

Location

Cumulative
Interview
Length (hours)

MegaVision

Engineer

R&D

Commercial
and Medical
Imaging

US

2.5

(removed in
final version)

(removed in final
version)

John
Boydson

Phil Kern

Program
Manager

Intergraph

Engineer

R&D, Manufacturing,
Marketing to
Businesses

Aerial Imaging

US

1.0

Gadi BenMark

VP and
General
Manager

Intergraph

Manager

R&D, Manufacturing,
Marketing to
Businesses

Aerial Imaging

US

0.75

HUP

Scientist,
Procurement
Manager

Wholesale User

Medical
Imaging

US

1.0

Dr. Alberto
Goldszal

Herbert
Keppler

Vice President Popular
Photography

Journalist

Publisher

Commercial
Imaging

US/Japan

2.5

Christian
Paulsen

Chief
Executive
Officer

Manager

R&D, Manufacturing,
Marketing to
Professional Users

Commercial
Imaging

Europe

2.75

Hasselbald

Per
Nordlund

Optical
engineer

Hasselbald

Engineer

R&D, Manufacturing,
Marketing to
Professional Users

Commercial
Imaging

Europe

0.5

[missing
name]

Head of US
operations

Tamron

Manager

Commercial
Imaging

US/Japan

1.0

Michihito
Yamaki

Chief
Executive
Officer

Sigma

Manager

Commercial
Imaging

Japan

0.5

Angelique
X. Irvin

Chief
Executive
Officer

Coviant

Manager

R&D, Manufacturing,
Marketing to
Professional Users
and Consumers
R&D, Manufacturing,
Marketing to
Professional Users
and Consumers
R&D, Manufacturing,
Marketing to
Governments

Military
Imaging

US

1.0

Fabio
Offredi

Director of
Product
Strategy and
Planning

Philips
Consumer
Electronics

Manager

R&D

Consumer
Electronics

Europe/Asia 2.5

Table 1: List of Informants
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Target Consumers Lay

Expert

Firm Status
Low

Undesirable position

Towards sectional design

High

Towards sectional integral

Undesirable position

Table 2: Firm Status and Consumer Sophistication Matrix
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Within the iPod
Processor
PortalPlayer
Operating System
Pixo

Disk drive
Toshiba
Memory
Sharp

Power-Management chips
Philips Electronics

DRAM buffer
Samsung
Electronics
iTunes
Apple

Battery
Sony and
others

Scroll wheel
Synaptics
Firewire
Apple
25

Figure XXX: iPod Architectural Design Scheme
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